We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier. We give subquadratic algorithms for finding a stable matching in special cases of two very natural succinct representations of the problem, the d-attribute and d-list models. We also give algorithms for verifying a stable matching in the same models. We further show that for d = ω(log n) both finding and verifying a stable matching in the d-attribute model requires quadratic time assuming the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis. The d-attribute model is therefore as hard as the general case for large enough values of d. *
Introduction
The stable matching problem has applications that vary from coordinating buyers and sellers to assigning students to public schools and residents to hospitals [16, 21, 27] . Gale and Shapley [14] proposed a quadratic time deferred acceptance algorithm for this problem which has helped clear matching markets in many real-world settings. For arbitrary preferences, the deferred acceptance algorithm is optimal and even verifying that a given matching is stable requires quadratic time [24, 28, 15] . This is reasonable since representing all participants' preferences requires quadratic space. However, in many applications the preferences are not arbitrary and can have more structure. For example, top doctors are likely to be universally desired by residency programs and students typically seek highly ranked schools. In these cases participants can represent their preferences succinctly. It is natural to ask whether the same quadratic time bounds apply with compact and structured preference models that have subquadratic representations. This will provide a more nuanced understanding of where the complexity lies: Is stable matching inherently complex, or is the complexity merely a result of the large variety of possible preferences? To this end, we examine two restricted preference models originally proposed by Bhatnagar et al. [7] , the d-attribute and d-list models. Using a wide range of techniques we provide algorithms and conditional hardness results for several settings of these models.
In the d-attribute model, we assume that there are d different attributes (e.g. income, height, sense of humor, etc.) with a fixed, possibly objective, ranking of the men for each attribute. Each woman's preference list is based on a linear combination of the attributes of the men, where each woman can have different weights for each attribute. Some women may care more about, say, height whereas others care more about sense of humor. Men's preferences are defined analogously. This model is applicable in large settings, such as online dating systems, where participants lack the resources to form an opinion of every other participant. Instead the system can rank the members of each gender according to the d attributes and each participant simply needs to provide personalized weights for the attributes. The combination of attribute values and weights implicitly represents the entire preference matrix. Bogomolnaia and Laslier [8] show that representing all possible n × n preference matrices requires n − 1 attributes. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that when d ≪ n − 1, we could beat the worst case quadratic lower bounds for the general stable matching problem.
In the d-list model, we assume that there are d different rankings of the men. Each women selects one of the d lists as her preference list. Similarly, each man chooses one of d lists of women as his preference list. This model captures the setting where members of one group (i.e. student athletes, sorority members, engineering majors) may all have identical preference lists. Mathematically, this model is actually a special case of the d-attribute model where each participant places a positive weight on exactly one attribute. However, its motivation is distinct and we can achieve improved results for this model. Chebolu et al. prove that approximately counting stable matchings in the d-attribute model for d ≥ 3 is as hard as the general case [11] . Bhatnagar et al. showed that sampling stable matchings using random walks can take exponential time even for a small number of attributes or lists but left it as an open question whether subquadratic algorithms exist for these models [7] .
We show that faster algorithms exist for finding a stable matching in some special cases of these models. In particular, we provide subquadratic algorithms for the d-attribute model, where all values and weights are from a small set, and the one-sided d-attribute model, where one side of the market has only one attribute. These results show we can achieve meaningful improvement over the general setting for some restricted preferences.
While we only provide subquadratic algorithms to find stable matchings in special cases of the attribute model, we have stronger results concerning verification of stable matchings. We demonstrate optimal subquadratic stability testing algorithms for the d-list and boolean d-attribute settings as well as a subquadratic algorithm for the general d-attribute model with constant d. These algorithms provide a clear distinction between the attribute model and the general setting. Moreover, these results raise the question of whether verifying and finding a stable matching are equally hard problems for these restricted models, as both require quadratic time in the general case.
Finally, we show that the stable matching problem in the d-attribute model for d = ω(log n) cannot be solved in subquadratic time under the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH) [18, 20] . We show SETH-hardness for both finding and verifying a stable matching, even if the weights and attributes are boolean. This adds the stable matching problem to a growing list of SETH-hard problems, including Fréchet distance [9] , edit distance [5] , string matching [1] , kdominating set [25] , orthogonal vectors [30] , model checking on sparse graphs [10] , and vector domination [19] . Thus the quadratic time hardness of the stable matching problem in the general case extends to the more restricted and succinct d-attribute model. This limits the space of models where we can hope to find subquadratic algorithms.
Dabney and Dean [12] study an alternative succinct preference representation where there is a canonical preference list for each side and individual deviations from this list are specified separately.
They provide an adaptive O(n + k) time algorithm for the special one-sided case, where k is the number of deviations. Bartholdi and Trick [6] present a subquadratic time algorithm for stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked preferences. Arkin et al. [4] derive a subquadratic algorithm for stable roommates with constant dimensional geometric preferences.
Summary of Results
Section 4.1 gives an O(C 2d n(d + log n)) time algorithm for finding a stable matching in the dattribute model if both the attributes and weights are from a set of size at most C. This gives a strongly subquadratic algorithm (i.e. O(n 2−ε ) for ε > 0) if d < 1 2 log C log n. Section 4.2 considers an asymmetric case, where one side of the matching market has d attributes, while the other side has a single attribute. We allow both the weights and attributes to be arbitrary real values. Our algorithm for finding a stable matching in this model has time complexityÕ(n 2−1/⌊d/2⌋ ), which is strongly subquadratic for constant d.
In Section 5.1 we consider the problem of verifying that a given matching is stable in the d-attribute model with real attributes and weights. The time complexity of our algorithm is O(n 2−1/2d ), which is again strongly subquadratic for constant d.
Section 5.2 gives an O(dn) time algorithm for verifying a stable matching in the d-list model. This is linear in its input size and is therefore optimal.
In Section 5.3 we give a randomizedÕ(n 2−1/O(c log 2 (c)) ) time algorithm for d = c log n for verifying a stable matching in the d-attribute model when both the weights and attributes are boolean. This algorithm is strongly subquadratic for d = O(log n).
Finally, in Section 6 we give a conditional lower bound for both finding and verifying a stable matching in the d-attribute model. We show that there is no strongly subquadratic algorithm when d = ω(log n) assuming the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis.
Preliminaries
A matching market consists of a set of men M and a set of women W with |M | = |W | = n. We further have a permutation of W for every m ∈ M , and a permutation of M for every w ∈ W , called preference lists. Note that representing a general matching market requires size Ω(n 2 ).
For a perfect bipartite matching µ, a blocking pair with respect to µ is a pair (m, w) ∈ µ where m ∈ M and w ∈ W , such that w appears before µ(m) in m's preference list and m appears before µ(w) in w's preference list. A perfect bipartite matching is called stable if there are no blocking pairs. In settings where ties in the preference lists are possible, we consider weakly stable matchings where (m, w) is a blocking pair if and only if both strictly prefer each other to their partner.
Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm [14] works as follows. While there is an unmatched man m, have m propose to his most preferred woman who has not already rejected him. A woman accepts a proposal if she is unmatched or if she prefers the proposing man to her current partner, leaving her current partner unmatched. Otherwise, she rejects the proposal. This process finds a stable matching in time O(n 2 ).
A matching market in the d-attribute model consists of n men and n women as before. A participant p has attributes A i (p) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and weights α i (p) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. For a man m and woman w, m's value of w is given by val m (w) = α(m),
. m ranks the women in decreasing order of value. Symmetrically, w's value of m is val w (m) = d i=1 α i (w)A i (m). Note that representing a matching market in the d-attribute model requires size O(dn). Unless otherwise specified, both attributes and weights can be negative.
A matching market in the d-list model is a matching market where both sides have at most d distinct preference lists. Describing a matching market in this model requires O(dn) numbers.
Throughout the paper, we useÕ to suppress polylogarithmic factors in the time complexity.
Finding Stable Matchings

Small Set of Attributes and Weights
We first present a stable matching algorithm for the d-attribute model when the attribute and weight values are limited to a set of constant size. In particular, we assume that the number of possible values for each attribute and weight for all participants is bounded by a constant C. 
There is an algorithm to find a stable matching in the d-attribute model with at most a constant C distinct attribute and weight values in time O(C 2d n(d + log n)).
Proof. Consider Algorithm 1. First observe that each man is indifferent between the women in a given set S i because each woman has identical attribute values. Moreover, the women in a set S i share the same ranking of the men, since they have identical weight vectors. Therefore, since we are looking for a stable matching, we can treat each set of women S i as an individual entity in a many to one matching where the capacity for each S i is the number of women it contains.
With these observations, the stability follows directly from the stability of the standard deferred acceptance algorithm for many-one stable matching. Indeed, each man proposes to the sets of women in the order of his preferences and each set of women tentatively accepts the best proposals, holding onto no more than the available capacity.
The grouping of the women requires O(C 2d + dn) time to initialize the groups and place each woman in the appropriate group. Creating the men's preference lists requires O(dC 2d n) time to evaluate and sort the groups of women for every man. The while loop requires O(C 2d n(d + log n)) time since each man will propose to at most C 2d sets of women and each proposal requires O(d + log n) time to evaluate and update the heap. This results in an overall running time of O(C 2d n(d + log n)).
As long as d < 1 2 log C log n, the time complexity in Theorem 1 will be subquadratic. It is worth noting that the algorithm and proof actually do not rely on any restriction of the men's attribute and weight values. Thus, this result holds whenever one side's attributes and weight values come from a set of constant size.
One-Sided Real Attributes
In this section we consider a one-sided attribute model with real attributes and weights. In this model, women have d attributes and men have d weights, and the preference list of a man is given by the weighted sum of the women's attributes as in the two-sided attribute model. On the other hand there is only one attribute for the men. The women's preferences are thus determined by whether they have a positive or negative weight on this attribute. For simplicity, we first assume that all women have a positive weight on the men's attribute and show a subquadratic algorithm for this case. Then we extend it to allow for negative weights.
To find a stable matching when the women have a global preference list over the men, we use a greedy approach: process the men from the most preferred to the least preferred and match each man with the highest unmatched woman in his preference list. This general technique is not specific to the attribute model but actually works for any market where one side has a single global preference list. (e.g. [12] uses a similar approach for their algorithm.) The complexity lies in repeatedly finding which of the available women is most preferred by the current top man.
This leads us to the following algorithm: for every woman w consider a point with A(w) as its coordinates and organize the set of points into a data structure. Then, for the men in order of preference, query the set of points against a direction vector consisting of the man's weight and find the point with the largest distance along this direction. Remove that point and repeat.
The problem of finding a maximal point along a direction is typically considered in its dual setting, where it is called the ray shooting problem. In the ray shooting problem we are given n hyperplanes and must maintain a data structure to answer queries. Each query consists of a vertical ray and the data structure returns the first hyperplane hit by that ray.
The relevant results are in Lemma 1 which follows from several papers for different values of d. For an overview of the ray shooting problem and related range query problems, see [2] . Lemma 1 ([17, 13, 23] ). Given an n point set in R d for d ≥ 2, there is a data structure for ray shooting queries with preprocessing timeÕ(n) and query timeÕ(n 1−1/⌊d/2⌋ ). The structure supports deletions with amortized update timeÕ(1).
For d = 1, queries can trivially be answered in constant time. We use this data structure to provide an algorithm when there is a global list for one side of the market. Lemma 2. For d ≥ 2 there is an algorithm to find a stable matching in the one-sided d-attribute model with real-valued attributes and weights in timeÕ(n 2−1/⌊d/2⌋ ) when there is a single preference list for the other side of the market.
Proof. For a man m, let dim(m) denote the index of the last non-zero weight, i.e. α dim(m)+1 (m) = · · · = α d (m) = 0. We assume dim(m) > 0, as otherwise m is indifferent among all women and we can pick any woman as µ(m). We assume without loss of generality α dim(m) (m) ∈ {−1, 1}. For each d ′ such that 1 ≤ d ′ ≤ d we build a data structure consisting of n hyperplanes in R d ′ . For each woman w, consider the hyperplanes
and for each d ′ preprocess the set of all hyperplanes according to Lemma 1. Note that
For a man m we can find his most preferred partner by querying the dim(m)-dimensional data structure. Let s = α dim(m) (m). Consider a ray r(m) ∈ R dim(m) originating at
in the direction (0, . . . , 0, s). If α dim(m) = 1 we find the lowest hyperplane intersecting the ray, and if α dim(m) = −1 we find the highest hyperplane. We claim that the first hyperplane r(m) hits corresponds to m's most preferred woman. Let woman w be preferred over woman
when s = 1 and
when s = −1.
Note that the query ray is dual to the set of hyperplanes with normal vector (α 1 (m), . . . , α d (m)). Now we pick the highest man m in the (global) preference list, consider the ray as above and find the first hyperplane H dim(m) (w) hit by the ray. We then match the pair (m, w), remove H(w) from all data structures and repeat. Correctness follows from the correctness of the greedy approach when all women share the same preference list and the properties of the halfspaces proved above.
The algorithm preprocesses d data structures, then makes n queries and dn deletions. The time is dominated by the n ray queries each requiring timeÕ(n 1−1/⌊d/2⌋ ). Thus the total time complexity is bounded byÕ(n 2−1/⌊d/2⌋ ), as claimed.
Algorithm 2: One-Sided Stable Matching // For points in P ∈ R d we use the notation (x 1 , . . . , x d ) to refer to its coordinates. Input: matching µ for d ′ = 1 to d do for each woman w do
We use the following lemma to extend the above algorithm to account for positive and negative weights for the women. It deals with settings where the women choose one of two lists (σ 1 , σ 2 ) as their preference lists over the men while the men's preferences can be arbitrary. Lemma 3. Suppose there are k women who use σ 1 . If the top k men in σ 1 are in the bottom k places in σ 2 , then the women using σ 1 will only match with those men and the n − k women using σ 2 will only match with the other n − k men in the woman-optimal stable matching.
Proof. Consider the operation of the woman-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm for finding the woman-optimal stable matching. Suppose the lemma is false so that at some point a woman using σ 1 proposed to one of the last n − k men in σ 1 . Let w be the first such woman. w must have been rejected by all of the top k, so at least one of those men received a proposal from a woman, w ′ , using σ 2 . However, since the top k men in σ 1 are the bottom k men in σ 2 , w ′ must have been rejected by all of the top n − k men in σ 2 . But there are only n − k women using σ 2 , so one of the top n − k men in σ 2 must have already received a proposal from a woman using σ 1 . This is a contradiction because w was the first woman using σ 1 to propose to one of the bottom n − k men in σ 1 (which are the top n − k men in σ 2 ).
We can now prove the following theorem where negative values are allowed for the women's weights.
Theorem 2. For d ≥ 2 there is an algorithm to find a stable matching in the one-sided d-attribute model with real-valued attributes and weights in timeÕ(n 2−1/⌊d/2⌋ ).
Proof. Suppose there are k women who have a positive weight on the men's attribute. Since the remaining n − k women's preference list is the reverse, we can use Lemma 3 to split the problem into two subproblems. Namely, in the woman-optimal stable matching the k women with a positive weight will match with the top k men, and the n − k women with a negative weight will match with the bottom n − k men. Now the women in each of these subproblems all have the same list. Therefore we can use Lemma 2 to solve each subproblem. Splitting the problem into subproblems can be done in time O(n) so the running time follows immediately from Lemma 2. Table 1 : Preference lists where a greedy approach will not work
As a remark, this "greedy" approach where we select a man, find his most preferred available woman, and permanently match him to her will not work in general. Table 1 describes a simple 2-list example where the unique stable matching is (m 1 w 2 , m 2 w 3 , m 3 w 5 , m 4 w 4 , m 5 w 1 ). In this instance, no participant is matched with their top choice. Therefore, the above approach cannot work for this instance. This illustrates to some extent why the general case seems more difficult than the one-sided case.
Verification
We now turn to the problem of verifying whether a given matching is stable. While this is as hard as finding a stable matching in the general setting, the verification algorithms we present here are more efficient than our algorithms for finding stable matchings in the attribute model.
Real Attributes and Weights
In this section we adapt the geometric approach for finding a stable matching in the one-sided dattribute model to the problem of verifying a stable matching in the (two-sided) d-attribute model. We express the verification problem as a simplex range searching problem in R 2d , which is the dual of the ray shooting problem. In simplex range searching we are given n points and answer queries that ask for the number of points inside a simplex. In our case we only need degenerate simplices consisting of the intersection of two halfspaces. Simplex range searching queries can be done in sublinear time for constant d.
Lemma 4 ([22]
). Given a set of n points in R d , one can process it for simplex range searching in time O(n log n), and then answer queries in timeÕ(n 1− 1 d ).
For 1 ≤ d ′ ≤ d we use the notation (x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y d ′ −1 , z) for points in R d+d ′ . We again let dim(w) be the index of w's last non-zero weight, assume without loss of generality α dim(w) ∈ {−1, 1}, and let sgn(w) = sgn(α dim(w) ). We partition the set of women into 2d sets W d ′ ,s for 1 ≤ d ′ ≤ d and s ∈ {−1, 1} based on dim(w) and sgn(w). Note that if dim(w) = 0, then w is indifferent among all men and can therefore not be part of a blocking pair. We can ignore such women.
For a woman w, consider the point
where m = µ(w) is the partner of w in the input matching µ. For a set W d ′ ,s we let P d ′ ,s be the set of points P (w) for w ∈ W d ′ ,s . The basic idea is to construct a simplex for every man and query it against all sets P d ′ ,s .
Given d ′ ,s, and a man m, let H 1 (m) be the halfspace
and only if m strictly prefers w ′ to w. Further let H 2 (m) be the halfspace
if and only if w ′ strictly prefers m to µ(w ′ ). Hence (m, w ′ ) is a blocking pair if and only if P (w ′ ) ∈ H 1 (m) ∩ H 2 (m).
Using Lemma 4 we immediately have an algorithm to verify a stable matching. 
Lists
When there are d preference orders for each side, and each participant uses one of the d lists, we provide a more efficient algorithm. Here, assume µ is the given matching between M and W . Let
be the set of d permutations on the women and {σ i } d i=1 be the set of d permutations on the men. Define rank(w, i) to be the position of w in permutation π i . This can be determined in constant time after O(dn) preprocessing of the permutations. Let head(π i , j) be the first woman in π i who uses permutation σ j and next(w, i) be the next highest ranked woman after w in permutation π i who uses the same permutation as w or ⊥ if no such woman exists. These can also be determined in constant time after O(dn) preprocessing by splitting the lists into sublists, with one sublist for the women using each permutation of men. The functions rank, head, and next are defined analogously for the men. Proof. We claim that algorithm 4 satisfies the theorem. Indeed, if the algorithm returns a pair (m, w) where m uses π i and w uses σ j , then (m, w) is a blocking pair because w appears earlier in π i than µ(m) and m appears earlier in σ j than µ(w).
On the other hand, suppose the algorithm returns that µ is stable but there is a blocking pair, (m, w), where m uses π i and w uses σ j . The algorithm considers permutations π i and σ j since it does not terminate early. Clearly if the algorithm evaluates m and w simultaneously when considering permutations π i and σ j , it will detect that (m, w) is a blocking pair. Therefore, the algorithm either moves from m to next(m, j) before considering w or it moves from w to next(w, i) before considering m. In the former case, rank(µ(m), i) < rank(w ′ , i) for some w ′ that comes before w in π i . Therefore m prefers µ(m) to w. Similarly, in the latter case, rank(µ(w), j) < rank(m ′ , i) for some m ′ that comes before m in σ j so w prefers µ(w) to m. Thus (m, w) is not a blocking pair and we have a contradiction.
The for and while loops proceed through all men and women once for each of the d lists in which they appear. Since at each step we are either proceeding to the next man or the next woman unless we find a blocking pair, the algorithm requires time O(dn). This is optimal since the input size is dn.
Boolean Attributes and Weights
In this section we consider the problem of verifying a stable matching when the d attributes and weights are restricted to boolean values and d = c log n. The algorithm closely follows an algorithm for the maximum inner product problem by Alman and Williams [3] . The idea is to express the existence of a blocking pair as a probabilistic polynomial with a bounded number of monomials and use fast rectangular matrix multiplication to evaluate it. A probabilistic polynomial for a function f is a polynomial p such that for every input x
We use the following tools in our algorithm. THR d is the threshold function that outputs 1 if at least d of its inputs are 1.
Lemma 5 ([3]
). There is a probabilistic polynomial for THR d on n variables and error ε with degree O( n log(1/ε)).
Lemma 6 ( [26, 29] ). There is a probabilistic polynomial for the disjunction of n variables and error ε with degree O(log(1/ε)) Lemma 7 ([31]). Given a polynomial P (x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . y m ) with at most n 0.17 monomials and two sets X, Y ⊆ {0, 1} m with |X| = |Y | = n, we can evaluate P on all pairs (x, y) ∈ X × Y in timẽ O(n 2 + m · n 1.17 ).
We construct a probabilistic polynomial that outputs 1 if there is a blocking pair. To minimize the degree of the polynomial, we pick a parameter s and divide the men and women into sets of size at most s. The polynomial takes the description of s men m 1 , . . . , m s and s women w 1 , . . . , w s along with their respective partners as input, and outputs 1 if and only if there is a blocking pair (m i , w j ) among the s 2 pairs of nodes with high probability.
Lemma 8. Let u be a large constant and s = n 1/uc log 2 c . There is a probabilistic polynomial with the following inputs:
• The attributes and weights of s men, A(m 1 ), . . . , A(m s ), α(m 1 ), . . . , α(m s )
• The attributes of the s women that are matched with these men A(µ(m 1 )), . . . , A(µ(m s ))
• The attributes and weights of s women, A(w 1 ), . . . , A(w s ), α(w 1 ), . . . , α(w s )
• The attributes of the s men that are matched with these women A(µ(w 1 )), . . . , A(µ(w s ))
The output of the polynomial is 1 if and only if there is a blocking pair with respect to the matching µ among the s 2 pairs in the input. The number of monomials is at most n 0.17 and the polynomial can be constructed efficiently.
Proof. A pair (m i , w j ) is a blocking pair if and only if α(m i ), A(µ(m i )) < α(m i ), A(w j ) and α(w j ), A(µ(w j )) < α(w j ), A(m i ) . Rewriting
we have a blocking pair if and only if i∈ [1,s] j∈ [1,s] 
Note that we can easily adapt this algorithm to finding strongly blocking pairs by defining F (x, y, a, b) as x, y ≤ a, b .
Using Lemma 5 with ε = 1 s 3 and Lemma 6 with ε = 1/4 we get a probabilistic polynomial of degree a √ d log s for some constant a and error 1/4 + 1/s < 1/3. Furthermore, since we are only interested in boolean inputs we can assume the polynomial to be multilinear. For large enough u we have 2d > a d log(s) (i.e. the degree is at most half of the number of variables) and the number Choosing u a large enough constant we can make δ and the exponent arbitrarily small. The factor of s 2 trivially only contributes a small constant to the exponent. Therefore we can bound the number of monomials by n 0.17 .
Theorem 5. In the d-attribute model with n men and women, and d = c log n boolean attributes and weights, there is a randomized algorithm to decide if a given matching is stable in timẽ O(n 2−1/O(c log 2 (c)) ) with error probability at most 1/3.
Proof. We again choose s = n 1/uc log 2 c and construct the probabilistic polynomial as in Lemma 8. We then divide the men and women into ⌈ n s ⌉ groups of size at most s. For a group of men m 1 , . . . , m s we let the corresponding input vector be
We set X as the set of all input vectors for the ⌈ n s ⌉ groups. We define the set Y symmetrically for the input vectors corresponding to the ⌈ n s ⌉ groups of women. Using Lemma 7 we evaluate the polynomial on all pairs x ∈ X, y ∈ Y in timẽ 
The probability that the output is wrong for any fixed input pair is at most 1/3. We repeat this process O(log n) times and take the threshold output for every pair of inputs, such that the error probability is at most O 1 n 2 for any fixed pair of inputs. Using a union bound we can make the probability of error at most 1/3 on any input. 6 Conditional Hardness
Background
The Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis has proved useful in arguing conditional hardness for a large number of problems. We show SETH-hardness for both verifying and finding a stable matching in the d-attribute model, even if the weights and attributes are boolean. The main step of the proof is a reduction from the maximum inner product problem to the stable matching problem. The maximum inner product problem is known to be SETH-hard. We give the fine-grained reduction from cnfsat to the vector orthogonality problem and from the vector orthogonality problem to the maximum inner product problem for the sake of completeness.
Definition 1 ( [18, 20] ). The Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH) stipulates that for each ε > 0 there is a k such that k-sat requires time Ω(2 (1−ε)n ). Lemma 9 ([20, 30, 3] ). Assuming SETH, for any ε > 0, there is a c such that solving the boolean maximum inner product problem on d = c log n dimensions requires time Ω(n 2−ε ).
Proof. The proof is a series of reductions from k-sat to boolean inner product. By the Sparsification Lemma [20] we can reduce k-sat to a subexponential number of k-sat instances with at most d = c k n clauses, where c k does not depend on n. Hence, assuming SETH, for any ε > 0, there is a c such that cnfsat with cn clauses requires time Ω(2 (1−ε)n ). We reduce cnfsat to the boolean vector orthogonality problem using a technique called Split and List. Divide the variable set into two sets S, T of size n 2 and for each set consider all N = 2 n/2 assignments to the variables. For every assignment we construct a d-dimensional vector where the ith position is 1 if and only if the assignment does not satisfy the ith clause of the CNF formula. Let U be the set of vectors corresponding to the assignments to S and V be the set of vectors corresponding to T . A pair u ∈ U , v ∈ V is orthogonal if and only if the corresponding assignment satisfies all clauses. An algorithm for boolean vector orthogonality in dimension d = cn = 2c log N and time O(N 2−ε ) = O(2 (1−ε/2)n ) would contradict SETH. Hence assuming SETH, for every ε > 0 there is a c such that the boolean vector orthogonality problem with d = c log N requires time Ω(N 2−ε ).
Finally, we reduce the boolean vector orthogonality problem to the boolean maximum inner product problem by partitioning the set U into sets U i for 0 ≤ i ≤ d where U i contains all vectors with Hamming weight i. Observe that a vector v ∈ V is orthogonal to a vector u ∈ U i if and only if u, ¬v = i, where ¬v is the element-wise complement of v. Thus U and V have an orthogonal pair, if and only if there is an i such that U i and ¬V = {¬v | v ∈ V } have a pair with inner product at least i. Therefore, for any ε > 0 there is a c such that the maximum inner product problem on d = c log N dimensions requires time Ω(N 2−ε ) assuming SETH.
Finding Stable Matchings
In this subsection we give a fine-grained reduction from the maximum inner product problem to the problem of finding a stable matching in the boolean d-attribute model. This shows that the stable matching problem in the d-attribute model is SETH-hard, even if we restrict the attributes and weights to booleans. Theorem 6. Assuming SETH, for any ε > 0, there is a c such that finding a stable matching in the boolean d-attribute model with d = c log n dimensions requires time Ω(n 2−ε ).
Proof. The proof is a reduction from maximum inner product to finding a stable matching. Given an instance of the maximum inner product problem with sets U, V ⊆ {0, 1} d where |U | = |V | = n and threshold l, we construct a matching market with n men and n women. For every u ∈ U we have a man m u with A(m u ) = u and α(m u ) = u. Similarly, for vectors v ∈ V we have women w v with A(w v ) = v and α(w v ) = v. This matching market is symmetric in the sense that for m u and w v , val mu (w v ) = val wv (m u ) = u, v .
We claim that any stable matching contains a pair (m u , w v ) such that the inner product u, v is maximized. Indeed, suppose there are vectors u ∈ U , v ∈ V with u, v ≥ l but there exists a stable matching µ with u ′ , v ′ < l for all pairs (m u ′ , w v ′ ) ∈ µ. Then (m u , w v ) is clearly a blocking pair for µ which is a contradiction.
Verifying Stable Matchings
In this section we give a reduction from the maximum inner product problem to the problem of verifying a stable matching, showing that this problem is also SETH-hard. Theorem 7. Assuming SETH, for any ε > 0, there is a c such that verifying a stable matching in the boolean d-attribute model with d = c log n dimensions requires time Ω(n 2−ε ).
Proof. We give a reduction from maximum inner product with sets U, V ⊆ {0, 1} d where |U | = |V | = n and threshold l. We construct a matching market with 2n men and women in the d ′attribute model with d ′ = d + 2(l − 1). Since d ′ < 3d the theorem then follows immediately from the SETH-hardness of maximum inner product.
For u ∈ U , let m u be a man in the matching market with attributes and weights A(m u ) = α(m u ) = u • 1 l−1 • 0 l−1 where we use • for concatenation. Similarly, for v ∈ V we have women
We Figure 1 : A representation of the reduction from maximum inner product to verifying a stable matching
Conclusion and Open Problems
We give subquadratic algorithms for finding and verifying stable matchings in the d-attribute model and d-list model. We also show that, assuming SETH, one can only hope to find such algorithms if the number of attributes d is bounded by O(log n).
For a number of cases there is a gap between the conditional lower bound and the upper bound. Our algorithms with real attributes and weights are only subquadratic if the dimension is constant. It would be interesting to either close or explain this gap. Even for small constants our algorithm to find a stable matching is not tight, as it is not subquadratic for any d = O(log n). The techniques we use when the attributes and weights are small constants do not readily apply to the more general case.
We also lack a subquadratic time algorithm for the problem of finding a stable matching with general real attributes and weights. Even for the arbitrary 2-list case we do not currently have a subquadratic algorithm. This 2-list case seems to be a good starting place for further research.
